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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impacts of federal support programs for sugar, peanuts, corn and wheat 
on U.S. and world markets, using a multi-country, multi-commodity, partial equilibrium world 
agricultural model. A five-year baseline projection is developed assuming past policy will 
continue. Four policy reform scenarios are then conducted. Each scenario considers the removal 
of federal programs such as loan rate, loan deficiency payments and other trade restrictions for 
each commodity (sugar, peanuts, corn and wheat). A fifth, and last, scenario looks at the impact 
of jointly eliminating the wheat and corn support programs.  Federal programs appear to have the 
maximum impacts on the sugar market, followed by the peanut market. As compared to sugar 
and peanuts, wheat and corn markets appear to be the least affected by federal support programs.  3
 
Impacts of Federal Support Programs for Sugar and Peanuts 
Compared to Corn and Wheat on U.S. and World Markets 
Introduction 
This paper examines the impacts of federal support programs for sugar and peanuts on the U.S. 
and world markets and compares them with programs for corn and wheat. The study uses a 
multi-country, multi-commodity, partial equilibrium world agricultural policy analysis model to 
analyze the impact  of federal support programs. A five-year baseline projection is developed 
assuming past policy will continue. In the next step, four different scenarios are conducted with 
each scenario incorporating removal of federal programs such as loan rate, loan deficiency 
payments, and other trade restrictions for each commodity. A fifth scenario is run eliminating 
wheat and corn programs simultaneously. The scenario results are compared with corresponding 
baseline results to estimate the impacts of support programs  on production, consumption, trade, 
and prices.  
The paper is organized as follows: After a brief overview of federal programs for each 
commodity, the structure of the partial equilibrium model is outlined along with detailed 
description of the U.S. model. In the final section, baseline and scenario projections are reported 
and results are discussed.  
Federal Support Programs 
The current federal program, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act 
(FAIR), constituted a significant change in agricultural policy from past commodity programs. 
Previous farm programs provided crop producers income support in the form of “deficiency 
payments” that were calculated on the basis of recorded crop acreage and government set target 
prices. When the market prices fell below the target price, farmers received deficiency payments 
equal to the difference in price to augment their income. In return for this protection, the   4
government sought to control the supply of program crops (wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, barley, 
oats, and cotton), through the use of acreage reduction programs (Runge 1998). Implementation 
of the 1996 FAIR Act immediately ended supply control (acreage reduction programs), target 
prices, and stock accumulation programs (Tweeten 1998) that had roots to previous programs 
established as far back as 1933.  1996 FAIR Act made significant changes to most crops except 
sugar and peanuts.  
Sugar program 
The sugar program functions as a price floor mechanism: a loan rate guarantees a minimum price 
to sugar producers, which is shared with processors and beet and cane farmers. This system of 
price support is made possible by a very tight restriction on imports of sugar via a set of bilateral 
tariff rate quotas (TRQ) managed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 
out-of-quota imports are taxed at a prohibitive tariff rate, which precludes importing more than 
the TRQ. Usually the imports are managed, such that the U.S. market prices of raw cane sugar 
and beet sugar price remain above the loan rate level, so USDA avoids having to buy up sugar 
forfeited under the loan program (U.S. General Accounting Office, USGAO).  
The U.S. sugar program and, more generally, the world sugar market have been analyzed, 
repeatedly over the years by many researchers. The most recent analyses are from USGAO 
(2000), Wohlgenant (1999), Sheals et al. (1999), and Haley (1998). These studies tend to focus 
on the welfare effects of the U.S. sugar program and its effect on the world price and the world 
market. These studies vary in their specifications of the sugar market and the sweetener industry.  
Our study departs from previous studies by first focusing on the time path of the adjustment 
that would result from a removal of the sugar program in the medium-term horizon (2004/05). 
Second, we attempt to integrate and describe both raw and refined sugar markets in our model of   5
the U.S. sugar industry. Those markets are then integrated in a large model of the raw sugar 
world market. Hence, our study is close in spirit to the study by USGAO regarding the 
description of the sugar industry, although our description of the U.S. demand for sugar does not 
reach the details included in that study. We are also close in spirit to Devadoss and Kropf (1996) 
who compared a sugar baseline scenario and a trade policy reform scenario between 1994 and 
2001. We pay special attention to the various agricultural markets affected by the sugar program 
(corn, beet, and cane) in the U.S. economy. We also compute the effect of the removal of the 
sugar program on the world market and resulting trade flows of sugar coming into the United 
States (both refined and raw sugar). 
Peanut Program 
The U.S. peanut program has a long history and has gone through many changes (USDA/FSA). 
The current policy regime was established in the 1996 FAIR Act. The policy instruments are a 
combination of production quota, price support mechanism, and price discrimination scheme 
between edible and crush peanuts, combined with import restrictions on edible peanuts to bolster 
prices. A description of each of these components follows. 
The 1999-crop national average support levels are $610 per short ton for quota (domestic 
edible use) peanuts and $132 per short ton for “additional” peanuts (in 1999 the latter was $175). 
Additionals can only be used for crush or export markets. The support rate on additional peanuts 
must be set at a level estimated to ensure no loss to CCC on the sale or disposal of additional 
peanuts. The 1996 FAIR Act also provides for the establishment of quota and additional loan 
pools for distribution of any profits from sales of loan collateral peanuts. There will not be a 
deduction from the loan advance for storage, handling, and inspection costs. By pure economic   6
arbitrage, the price received on additionals should b e no less than the world price of edible 
peanuts (FOB export price) (Rucker and Thurman 1990). 
The national quota for 2000 crop peanuts is 1,180,000 tons for all uses, unchanged from 
1999. Peanut growers, through a referendum, approve these quotas. Undermarketings of quota 
peanuts were eliminated in the 1996 FAIR Act. 
Restrictions on the price support level constitute a price discrimination scheme. The top 
price support level is available during harvest season, only on Segregation 1 peanuts, within 
quota. S upport at the "additional" price support level is available on so-called additional peanuts 
grown within quota or without a quota. Over quota peanuts marketed for domestic edible use are 
subject to a prohibitive penalty of 140 percent of the quota price support rate. Support is carried 
out through approved grower associations. Additional peanuts for crushing or export may be 
marketed under contracts between producers and handlers. Such contracts, however, must be 
approved before September 15 of each year. A dditional peanuts not under contract must be 
marketed under additional price support loans. 
The peanut producer price may be supported through loans to producers on farm-stored 
peanuts and through purchases from producers. The peanut marketing year begins August 1 and 
ends July 31. Loans for the crop of warehouse-stored peanuts are available from time of harvest 
through January. Purchase agreements or loans on quota peanuts are available through March. 
Loans are available on additional peanuts through January of the following year. Additional 
peanuts are not eligible for purchase agreements. A producer with peanuts under a purchase 
agreement or farm-stored loan must deliver the peanuts by the end of April of the following year.   7
NAFTA 
U.S. tariffs on peanuts  are being phased out in conjunction with the treatment of quantitative 
restrictions (USDA/FSA). Imports of peanuts into Mexico were already duty-free before the 
NAFTA. Under NAFTA and since 1994, U.S. Section 22 import quotas on Mexican peanuts 
have been r eplaced by a TRQ, which is being phased out during a 15-year transition period. 
Mexico received an initial 3,377-ton TRQ for shelled and in-shell peanuts. This quantity grows 
by a three percent annually compounded rate over the transition period. The 1998  TRQ was 
3,801 metric tons.  
In-quota shipments enter the United States duty-free. Above-quota imports from Mexico 
faced an initial tariff equivalent of 123.1 percent on shelled and 186.1 percent on an in-shell 
basis. These over-quota tariffs are being phased out by 15 percent in the first six years, with the 
remaining tariff to be phased out on a straight-line basis over the final nine years. 
Rules of origin constrain Mexican and Canadian exports to the United States. Canadian peanut 
butter is constrained by mild rules of origin. Origin is conferred on peanut butter and paste made 
from non-NAFTA peanuts, but roasting or blanching of non-NAFTA peanuts does not confer 
origin. For U.S. imports of Mexican raw peanuts, roasted and blanched peanuts, peanut butter, 
and peanut paste, peanuts must be totally sourced in Mexico. This same "domestically produced" 
rule applies for U.S. exports to Mexico of peanuts and peanut products.  
Model Structure 
The models used to analyze the impacts of federal support programs on w heat, corn, sugar and 
peanuts are non-spatial, partial equilibrium in nature. Each of the commodity models except the 
peanut model, consists of major producing, exporting, and importing countries. The country   8
coverage for wheat, corn, and sugar can be found in FAPRI publciations. For peanuts, we have 
used a fully developed U.S. model and a reduced form rest-of-the-world to close the model.  
The general structure of the country sub-model is similar to the individual country sub-model 
for sugar shown in figure 1. As shown in Figure 1, the general structure of the country sub-model 
includes behavioral equations for area harvested, yield, production on the supply side, and per 
capita consumption and ending stocks on the demand side. Equilibrium prices, quantities, and net 
trade are determined by equating excess supply and excess demand across countries and regions. 
The domestic price of each country or region is linked with a representative world price through 
exchange rates and other policy wedges such as tariffs and transfer-service margins. Because of 
the overall scope of the model, it is not feasible to include the complete empirical model in the 
text. The general framework for each country sub-model consists of the following: 
Area harvested = f (AHt-1, CPt-1, APt-1, Trend), 
Yield = f (Yieldt-1, Trend), 
Crop production = Area harvested*Yield 
Per capita food consumption = f (CP, AP, PCRGDP), 
Feed consumption = (CP, AP, AN) 
Ending stocks = f (ESt-1, CP), 
with AH denoting acreage, CP being the own-crop price, AP d enoting the price of alternative 
crops, PCRGDP representing real per capita GDP, ES representing ending stock, SC denoting 
consumption and AN denoting animal numbers. In many countries the crop prices are set by 
policy and can be treated as being predetermined. In some countries, yield improvements are 
captured by a time trend. In many important countries, such as the United States, total area under 
each crop is estimated by using regional acreage response.    9
Data for area harvested, yield, production, consumption, and ending stock were gathered 
from the PSD (Production, Supply and Demand) view of USDA, and Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Data for domestic prices and policy variables are 
collected from attaché reports and other local country sources. Macroeconomic data such as real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), consumer price index, population, and exchange rate were 
gathered from sources including International Financial Statistics, WEFA Group (Wharton 
Economic Forecasting Agency), Project Link, and McGraw Hill’s DRI (Data Resources 
Incorporated). 
U.S. Crops Model 
For the United States, each of the crops is modeled in more detailed manner as compared to the 
general structure described in the previous section. For wheat and corn, total area is divided into 
regional area response and is specified as a function of own and competing net returns, 
calculated using maximum of either price or loan rate. Demand is broken down into food, feed, 
seed, and other uses. More information on U.S. wheat and corn model can be obtained from 
FAPRI-UMC#19-96 (See Reference Section).  
Sugar Model 
In the sugar model, we begin with the farm sectors and work our way to the final consumer of 
sugar and sweetener-containing goods. In the first stage, raw beet production is transformed into 
white sugar, cane sequentially is transformed into raw and refined sugar, and corn going into 
HFCS, which is a substitute for sugar in food processing. Refined sugar is consumed as a final 
good. We model demand and supply in each market, and allow market closure.  
The supply of beets is a function of the price of beets and the price of competing crops such 
as wheat. The demand for beets is a totally inelastic derived demand that comes from white sugar   10
extraction from beets. S imilarly, the supply of cane is a function of cane price and the price of 
vegetable and fruit crops competing for resources in cane-growing regions. The demand for cane 
comes from raw cane sugar production and it is constrained by the exogenous extraction  rate of 
raw sugar from the agricultural production of cane.  
Raw sugar supply decisions come from profit maximization in raw cane sugar extraction. 
The constant marginal cost of extraction is equated to the price of raw cane sugar. The price 
received is the maximum of the market price or the loan rate for raw cane sugar. We assume that 
the prevailing raw cane sugar price is above the sugar loan rate as it has been with the current 
sugar program. The demand for raw cane sugar comes from cane sugar refining.  We assume a 
fixed proportion between refined and raw cane sugar.  
Imports of raw sugar compete with the domestic supply of raw sugar. We follow Moschini 
(1991) in the description of the import supply under a TRQ. We essentially have three potential 
regimes. If the import demand schedule falls within the quota, then there is a supply response 
(both quantity and price change). If the import demand is at the TRQ, rents are generated for the 
holder of the import rights corresponding to the binding TRQ. The import price is equal to the 
world price equivalent to the point where the TRQ is just binding, plus the unit quota rents, 
which equates the domestic price and the import price inclusive of the rent. This situation 
corresponds to the current U.S. sugar TRQ. If the excess demand for raw sugar is sufficiently 
beyond the TRQ, it then intersects on the higher portion of the import supply inclusive of the 
high tariff. In this case, both the imported price and quantity supplied will respond to shifts in the 
excess demand. The rest of the world satisfies the excess demand of raw sugar in the United 
States. The excess supply comes from the rest of the world. The excess supply from the rest of 
the world, IRCS, is:    11
IRCSiq(Pwrcs)=aircs+bircsPwrcs, if excess demand for raw cane sugar< TRQrcs or 
IRCS=TRQrcs and P rcs=Pwrcs+unit rent<Pwrcs+high tariff; with P wrcs evaluated at IRCSiq=TRQrcs, or 
IRCSoq(Pwrcs+high tariff)=aircs+bircs(Pwrcs+high tariff) if excess demand >TRQrcs and   
Prcs=Pwrcs+high tariff, 
with P wrcs denoting the world price of raw cane sugar, TRQrcs  denoting the TRQ for raw sugar, 
and the subscripts iq and oq denoting the in-quota and out-of-quota import supply schedules. 
Market equilibrium is obtained by equating excess demand for raw cane sugar and the raw cane 
sugar import supply. 
In the white sugar market, there are three sources of white sugar supply: domestic beet sugar 
supply, domestic refined cane sugar supply, and import supply of white sugar. Domestic refined 
cane sugar comes from refining domestic and i mported raw cane sugar. Raw sugar imports are 
the predominant form of imports, but imports of refined sugar occur as well. The United States 
has TRQ’s for both types of sugar.  
Imports of white sugar (IWS) are supplied by the rest of the world, primarily b y Mexico 
(TRQ of 50,000 metric tons in 1998/99 [Buzzanell]). They are influenced by U.S. TRQ and 
tariffs imposed by the U.S. government on sugar trade. Out-of-quota imports originating from 
Mexico come primarily in the form of raw sugar and will be treated entirely as such for 
simplicity purposes (see section on raw sugar). As in the case of raw sugar imports, although the 
TRQ on IWS can be binding, there is an underlying world supply, which would respond to price 
if the TRQ were removed. The excess supply from the rest of the world, IWS is  
IWSiq(Pwws) if excess demand < TRQws with ￿IWS/￿p > 0 or 
IWS=￿|TRQws and Pws=Pwws+unit rent<Pwws+high tariff with Pwws evaluated a IWSiq=TRQws, or 
IWSoq(Pws+high tariff) if excess demand >TRQws and Pws=Pwws+high tariff,   12
With P wws denoting the world price of refined sugar, TRQws being the TRQ for refined sugar, and 
subscripts, iq and oq, denoting in-quota and out-of-quota import supply schedules.  
The derived demand for refined sugar comes from food-processing industries producing 
sweetener-intensive goods and is specified as a function of own  price, per capita real income and 
HFCS price. The equilibrium condition in the white sugar market equates the total quantity 
supplied of white sugar to the total quantity demanded of white sugar. 
Peanut Model 
We mostly follow Rucker and Thurman (1990), Borgess (1995), Skinner (1999), and Chen and 
Fletcher (1997) in identifying important features of the peanut program for our economic 
analysis. Quotas for "program" peanuts regulate production. There are support prices for quota 
peanuts and for additional peanuts. Trade restrictions are imposed on imports of edible peanuts 
via a TRQ. There is free entry in additional peanuts and export markets. Quota rights owners 
receive the edible price. There is a buyback option to bring additional peanuts back into the 
edible market at quota price.  
We also assume that U.S. growers only grow edible quality, which can also be crushed. 
Foreign competitors produce both edible and crush quality. The world market determines world 
prices. Crushed peanut trade is free of all trade barriers. 
The quota and price support just displace domestic consumption of edibles to the export 
market. This is the typical model of price discrimination between domestic and foreign markets. 
The world price, P e is the marginal price. The buyback option allows for getting rid of the excess 
edible domestic demand, given a price support level. The quota affects infra-marginal production 
and its removal affects the producer surplus because rents disappear. However, the removal of 
the quota does not affect the level of production at the margin.   13
On the supply side, peanut acreage response is separated into quota and out-of-quota 
acreage. Quota acreage is derived from exogenously determined quota production, whereas 
additional acreage is specified as function e xpected return on additional peanut and quota 
acreage. On the demand side, peanut demand is divided into edible, crush, and export demand. 
Per capita edible peanut demand is specified as a function of per capita real income and the 
maximum of peanut loan r ate or average peanut price. Crush demand depends on peanut price, 
and export demand is specified as a function of peanut price and the quantity of additional 
production. Since we don’t have a world peanut model, the model is closed with a reduced form 
excess supply function facing the United States, and world peanut price is solved by 
equilibrating excess supply with excess demand.  
Simulation Results 
As we mentioned earlier, in order to examine the effects of the removal of price supports for U.S. 
sugar,  peanuts, wheat and corn, a five-year baseline projection (2000/01-04/05) is established. In 
the baseline, all endogenous variables (area, production, consumption, ending stocks, exports, 
imports, prices, etc.) are projected over the projection period, using forecasted exogenous 
variables (real GDP, exchange rate, consumer price index, etc.). The baseline also assumes 
continuation of current policy for the entire projection period. One of the most important policy 
variables is an assumption regarding EEP expenditure. Since EEP has not been used since June 
of 1995 and there is no strong support for resumption of EEP subsidies, we have assumed no 
subsidized grain exports during our baseline period. The baseline then serves as the reference 
point to compare the effects of the various scenarios.  
Scenario one, which includes removal of the U.S. sugar program, such as loan rate, TRQ, 
and other trade restrictions, is reported in Table 1. The table shows the impact of the removal of   14
the TRQ’s on raw and refined sugar combined with a removal of the support price provided by 
the loan rate on the U.S. economy. Results are shown in levels (baseline and scenario) and in 
deviations from the baseline levels. The U.S. raw sugar price would be reduced by 63 percent in 
2000/01 and would stay approximately 55 percent below what it would have been in the baseline 
in 2004/05. The price is now at the world price level, following trade liberalization.  
The cane farm price collapses following the sharp decrease in raw cane price. It f alls by 
more than 43 percent for every year of the projection period. U.S. cane sugar production would 
decrease by 4 to 5 percent relative to its baseline level, a relatively small decrease attributable to 
the fact that sugar cane production is price inelastic in the short run. In the long run, under the 
expectation of a permanent decrease in profitability, some cane producers would just exit the 
industry. It is difficult to model exit decisions, and our model, in essence, describes the short-
term response to the policy change. 
The U.S. sugar beet price would also fall dramatically by 51 percent in the first year, then 
slowly recovers to about 39 percent below the baseline level in 2004/05. Beet production would 
fall by about 10 percent relative to its baseline level. As it is the case for cane production, the 
supply of beet is price inelastic in the short run. 
Refined sugar production in the United States would increase moderately. This comes from 
the aggregation of several effects, which partially offset each other. Refiners of raw cane 
production actually increase their production of refined sugar by processing a much larger 
quantity of imported raw sugar. Indeed, imports of raw sugar more than double every year during 
the 2000 to 2002 period, and then remain very high until 2004/05, above 2.9 millions tons. The 
importance of domestic raw cane sugar decreases in domestic refined sugar production. 
Similarly, there is a decrease in U.S. beet sugar production.   15
Hence, the sum of the three effects (increased imports being refined, less domestic cane 
being refined, and less beet sugar produced) is positive. It is very clear that domestic refiners 
would benefit from the cheaper imports, despite the lower refined sugar price they face in their 
output market. A slight increase in refined sugar imports brings some additional competitive 
pressure on the U.S. refined sugar market. 
The U.S. price of refined sugar falls to the world price level of refined sugar, inducing an 
increase in refined sugar imports. Because of the  increased import of refined sugar in the United 
States, the world refined sugar price increases moderately by about 12.5 percent the first year 
and by smaller increases in the subsequent years of the simulation exercise. The impact on the 
world raw sugar m arket is a bit more substantial. Because of the large increase in U.S. raw sugar 
imports, the world price of raw sugar increases by 16 percent in 2000/01, 15 percent in the 
following year and 12 percent in 2002/03.  
U.S. consumption of refined sugar increases between 6 and 7 percent relative to the baseline, 
during the whole period. Consumption increases because refined sugar price has fallen. The 
increase in consumption is moderate, between 6 and 7 percent. HFCS use declines slightly in our 
simulation by 5 to 7 percent. This impact is caused by the substitution we assume between sugar 
and HFCS in sweetener demand. As a result, we also predict a slight decrease in the demand for 
corn in HFCS (decrease of between 28 to 38 million-bushel) and a resulting moderate decrease 
in corn price of 1 to 2 cents per bushel. Hence, our results are consistent with Rendleman and 
Hertel (1993) who found that the benefits of the sugar program to corn producers have been 
overstated.  
Consequently, the big losers in the case of  trade liberalization and policy reform would be 
the domestic growers of beet and cane, the cane extractors, and beet processors. Sectors that   16
stand to gain would be the cane refiners and sugar users, who would pay much less for sugar. 
The world market producers not involved in the current TRQ system for the United States would 
also benefit through higher prices. 
The second scenario consisted of removing all federal support programs for peanuts, 
including production quota and loan rate. This is complimented  by removing all trade restrictions 
including the ban on imports. The removal of import restrictions affects the peanut markets by 
allowing free imports in the domestic markets. World and domestic prices become equal once 
binding restrictions on imports are removed. World price for shelled peanuts was transmitted into 
the domestic market by removing $200 for shelling cost and taking into account 25 percent loss 
in product weight and an additional 12 percent loss due to cleaning and culling.  
The simulation r esults of impacts on the peanut market are presented in Table 2. As shown, 
the total peanut acreage without the federal program is likely to increase between 5 to 6 percent 
in the next five years, mainly because of a higher world price compared to the additional price. 
However, production is projected to increase slightly less than area increase as some of the gains 
in acreage are offset by declines in yield. Yield is projected to decline as compared to baseline, 
mainly because of the addition of marginal l and brought into peanut production. On the 
consumption side, total use of peanuts, both for edible and crush, is projected to rise by an 
average of 5 to 7 percent annually with the elimination of federal support program. The rise in 
consumption is possible because of lower domestic peanut prices, which were artificially kept at 
or above loan rate with the support program.  
Both U.S. imports and exports are projected to increase with the elimination of trade 
restrictions. Exports are projected to increase by an average of 45 to 50 million pounds 
(approximately 6 percent), whereas removal of the import ban allows significant amounts of   17
peanuts to enter the domestic market. Imports rise by more than 131 million pounds (79 percent) 
in the first year of liberalization. However, by 2005, the quantity of imports falls due to the 
adjustment in domestic production and rise in domestic price, reaching 196 million pounds (18 
percent higher as compared to baseline). Rising imports and domestic production are projected to 
exceed the increase in domestic uses, resulting in a fall in domestic price. Domestic peanut price 
is likely to fall by an average of 11 to 15 percent during the period of consideration. The price 
impacts on the world market are exactly the opposite that of the domestic market, with the world 
price of shelled peanuts rising by 2 cents per pound (an increase of 5 percent as compared to the 
baseline).   
Table 3 contains the baseline projections and effects of the removal of the price support for 
U.S. wheat:  production is impacted only slightly through net returns, and domestic consumption 
through the farm price. The largest impact is in the first year of the removal of price supports 
when the season average farm price is nearest to the loan rate. U.S. exports of wheat are only 
slightly impacted. World trade of wheat and corn are minimally changed. Cross commodity 
effects on corn and soybean production, use, exports, and season average farm price all show less 
than a 1 percent deviation from the baseline. 
Table 4 contains the baseline projections and the results of the effects of the removal of the 
price support for U.S. corn: production, use, exports, and season average farm price of corn 
experience only small changes during the projection period when compared to the base run. The 
largest impact is in the first year of the removal of price supports when the season average farm 
price is nearest to the loan rate, resulting in a 1 percent drop in production and a less than 1 
percent drop in price as exports also decline. World trade of wheat and corn are only minimally 
changed, with the declines in corn trade of less than 1 percent being offset by increases in wheat   18
trade by less than 1 percent. Cross commodity effects on wheat production, use, exports, and 
season a verage farm price all show less than a 1 percent deviation from the baseline. This 
scenario makes soybeans slightly more attractive to producers, resulting in a slight increase in 
production of less than 1 percent, which results in a 1.7 percent decline in price in 2000/01, 
which moderates as we move through the period. 
Finally, Table 5 contains the baseline projections and the results of removing price support 
for both wheat and corn simultaneously: production, use, exports, and season average farm price 
for corn and wheat experience only small changes during the projection period when compared 
to the base run. The largest impact is in the first year of the removal of price supports when the 
season average farm prices are nearest to the loan rate. The magnitude of changes is all less than 
1 percent for production, use, exports and season average price for both corn and wheat. World 
trade of wheat and corn is only minimally impacted, with changes of less than 1 percent. 
Production, use, exports and season average farm price of soybeans is only slightly affected in 
this scenario. Production, exports, and use show less than a 1 percent change from the baseline. 
Soybean price declines in the initial year by 2 percent before the change moderates compared to 
the baseline by the end of the projection period. 
With the caveat of partial equilibrium analysis, federal programs appear to have the 
maximum impacts on sugar market, followed by peanut. As compared to sugar and peanut, 
wheat and corn markets appear to be least affected by federal support program. However, grain 
results particularly wheat is greatly affected by baseline assumption regarding EEP subsidies. If 
we assume resumption of EEP subsidies in the baseline run, then the results for wheat would 




This study utilizes a partial equilibrium, policy simulation model to measure the impact of 
federal support programs on various commodities such as sugar, peanuts, wheat, and corn. Five 
separate scenarios were conducted; four scenarios analyze the removal of each individual 
program and the fifth simultaneously removes the grain programs for corn and wheat, since these 
two crops compete for acreage in many states. The simultaneous removal of all programs (sugar, 
peanuts and grains) was not conducted because of the lack of significant interaction between 
them. The latter scenario would be essentially be additive and would not provide new 
information. The sum of the impacts of the individual reforms (sugar, peanuts and grains) 
provides a good approximation of the impact of the joint removal.  
The results suggest that federal programs have a significant effect on the sugar market. 
Removal of the loan rate and trade restrictions would increase raw sugar imports 126 percent in 
2000/01. The U.S. raw sugar price would initially be reduced by 63 percent in 2000/01 and 
would average levels approximately 59 percent below the baseline levels for the projection 
period. Responding to the price decline, cane and beet farmers would reduce production by 5 and 
10 percent, respectively.  
Counterintuitive to the decline in cane and beet production, U.S. refined sugar production 
actually increases 9 percent in the first year because of a huge inflow of imported raw sugar into 
the domestic market. Apart from the sugar market, the corn market is also adversely affected by 
this liberalization because of substitution between HFCS and refined sugar in the food-
processing sector. Lower sugar prices reduce the demand for HFCS by about 8 percent in   20
2000/01, with a similar decline in price. Lower use of HFCS reduces corn used for Ethanol by 28 
to 38 million bushels, lowering corn prices by one to two cents per bushel.  
Similar to sugar, removal of the federal program for peanuts leads to a rise in imports of 
edible peanuts from the world market. But the extent of rise in imports due to trade liberalization 
is much smaller than for sugar. The average peanut farm price decreases by 13 percent during the 
first year of the p rojection period. Although the average farm price decreases, domestic peanut 
production is projected to increase because the marginal price received by farmers increases 
through elimination of the federal program. One of the main beneficiaries of the program 
elimination is the consumer, who consumes more peanuts because of the lower price. On the 
world level, the program elimination leads to a 5 to 6 percent higher price mainly because of 
higher imports. 
Unlike for sugar and peanuts, elimination of the federal program for corn and wheat seems 
to have a small impact on domestic production, use, exports, and season average farm prices 
during the projection period when compared to the base run. The largest impact is in the first 
year of the removal of price supports when the season average farm price for corn is nearest to 
the loan rate. In the later years, elimination of the loan rate has minimal effect on production, 
consumption, exports, and prices, as the average farm price was higher than the loan rate. 
However, wheat results should be interpreted with caution as a different baseline assumption 



















































Table 1. Impacts of Removal of U.S. Sugar Support Program 
  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
U.S. Cane Production   (1000 Short Tons) 
Baseline  3970.44  3969.04  3988.04  4015.51  4045.14 
Scenario  3807.63  3817.40  3823.51  3842.74  3844.88 
Change  -162.81  -151.64  -164.52  -172.76  -200.27 
% change  -4.10%  -3.82%  -4.13%  -4.30%  -4.95% 
U.S. Beet Production         
Baseline  4797.82  4837.11  4853.61  4876.44  4909.68 
Scenario  4362.34  4307.87  4337.17  4385.24  4458.07 
Change  -435.48  -529.24  -516.44  -491.20  -451.61 
% change  -9.08%  -10.94%  -10.64%  -10.07%  -9.20% 
U.S. Refined Sugar Production  
Baseline  9595.45  9797.43  9886.50  9986.39  10104.59 
Scenario  10468.13  10547.52  10580.89  10612.25  10694.17 
Change  872.69  750.10  694.38  625.85  589.57 
% change  9.09%  7.66%  7.02%  6.27%  5.83% 
U.S. Raw Sugar Imports         
Baseline  1240.33  1421.50  1480.91  1536.43  1598.94 
Scenario  2808.31  2939.33  2939.19  2903.53  2916.28 
Change  1,567.98  1,517.83  1,458.27  1,367.10  1,317.34 
% change  126.42%  106.78%  98.47%  88.98%  82.39% 
U.S. Refined Sugar Imports         
Baseline  83.50  98.50  106.00  113.50  121.00 
Scenario  97.87  101.17  103.46  112.84  125.02 
Change  14.37  2.67  -2.54  -0.66  4.02 
% change  17.21%  2.71%  -2.39%  -0.58%  3.33% 
U.S. Refined Sugar Consumption       
Baseline  9655.37  9833.13  9893.52  9999.52  10117.09 
Scenario  10404.76  10525.95  10561.60  10619.86  10709.99 
Change  749.39  692.82  668.08  620.34  592.90 
% change  7.76%  7.05%  6.75%  6.20%  5.86% 
U.S. Sugarcane price  (Dollar per Short Ton) 
Baseline  25.34  26.22  26.95  27.37  27.95 
Scenario  13.41  14.14  14.84  15.49  15.91 
Change  -11.93  -12.08  -12.11  -11.88  -12.04 
% change  -47.07%  -46.08%  -44.95%  -43.42%  -43.07% 
U.S. Sugar Beet price          
Baseline  38.30  37.80  38.44  38.83  39.37 
Scenario  18.85  19.60  20.95  22.64  23.90 
Change  -19.44  -18.20  -17.49  -16.19  -15.46 
% change  -50.77%  -48.15%  -45.50%  -41.70%  -39.28% 
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Table 1. Continued 
  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
U.S. Raw Sugar price     (Cents per Pound)   
Baseline  19.37  20.27  21.01  21.44  22.04 
Scenario  7.23  7.96  8.68  9.34  9.78 
Change  -12.15  -12.30  -12.34  -12.10  -12.26 
% change  -62.69%  -60.70%  -58.71%  -56.44%  -55.64% 
World Raw Sugar Price           
Baseline  6.25  6.95  7.78  8.56  9.08 
Scenario  7.23  7.96  8.68  9.34  9.78 
Change  0.97  1.02  0.90  0.78  0.70 
% change  15.57%  14.62%  11.60%  9.07%  7.71% 
World Refined Sugar Price           
Baseline  9.49  10.54  11.80  12.99  13.77 
Scenario  10.67  11.18  12.13  13.36  14.31 
Change  1.19  0.64  0.34  0.37  0.54 
% change  12.50%  6.08%  2.85%  2.82%  3.92% 
Corn Used for HFCS     (Million Bushels)   
Baseline  583.65  600.94  619.15  636.01  653.78 
Scenario  545.41  564.91  585.39  605.72  625.34 
Change  -38.24  -36.03  -33.76  -30.30  -28.44 
% change  -6.55%  -6.00%  -5.45%  -4.76%  -4.35% 
U.S. Corn Price     (Dollars per Bushel)   
Baseline  2.07  2.07  2.16  2.16  2.23 
Scenario  2.05  2.05  2.15  2.15  2.23 
Change  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
% change  -0.86%  -0.86%  -0.35%  -0.45%  -0.38% 
HFCS USE           
Baseline  9417.91  9492.40  9472.49  9486.33  9517.60 
Scenario  8713.62  8829.55  8851.43  8928.96  8994.59 
Change  -704.29  -662.85  -621.07  -557.37  -523.02 
% change  -7.48%  -6.98%  -6.56%  -5.88%  -5.50% 
HFCS Price           
Baseline  12.98  13.37  13.74  14.12  14.45 
Scenario  11.86  12.32  12.73  13.19  13.57 
Change  -1.11  -1.05  -1.00  -0.93  -0.88 
% change  -8.58%  -7.85%  -7.31%  -6.57%  -6.11% 
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Table 2. Impacts of Removal of U.S. Peanut Support Program 
  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
Planted Area  (1,000 Acres) 
Baseline  1494  1492  1531  1527  1525 
Scenario  1583  1588  1599  1610  1613 
Change  90  97  67  83  88 
% change  6.0%  6.5%  4.4%  5.5%  5.8% 
   
Production  (1000 Short Tons) 
Baseline  3836  3849  3961  3968  3982 
Scenario   4046  4076  4120  4165  4191 
Change  209  227  159  197  208 
% change  5.5%  5.9%  4.0%  5.0%  5.2% 
           
Imports           
Baseline  165  165  165  165  165 
Scenario  295.83  262.56  243.40  213.00  196.73 
Change  131  98  78  48  32 
% change  79%  59%  48%  29%  19% 
           
Domestic Use           
Baseline  3233  3268  3318  3343  3367 
Scenario  3447  3495  3521  3541  3560 
Change  214  227  203  198  193 
% change  7%  7%  6%  6%  6% 
 
Exports           
Baseline  807  782  795  790  784 
Scenario  853  842  846  837  830 
Change  45  60  51  47  46 
% change  6%  8%  6%  6%  6% 
           
Farm Price  ($/lb.) 
Baseline  0.258  0.272  0.270  0.268  0.269 
Scenario  0.225  0.228  0.231  0.232  0.233 
Change  -0.033  -0.044  -0.038  -0.036  -0.036 
% change  -13%  -16%  -14%  -14%  -13% 
           
Quota Loan Rate 
Baseline  0.305  0.305  0.305  0.305  0.305 
Scenario  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Change  -0.305  -0.305  -0.305  -0.305  -0.305 
% change  -100%  -100%  -100%  -100%  -100% 
           
World Peanut Price (shelled) 
Baseline  0.41  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43 
Scenario  0.441  0.446  0.450  0.451  0.453 
Change  0.026  0.020  0.021  0.020  0.021 
% change  6%  5%  5%  5%  5%   25
 
Table 3. Impacts of Removal of Wheat price support  
    00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
Wheat Production  (Million Bushels) 
  Baseline    2,195  2,238  2,339  2,364  2,398 
  Scenario    2,166  2,244  2,335  2,367  2,397 
  Change    -29  6  -4  3  -1 
  % Change    -1.3%  0.3%  -0.2%  0.1%  -0.1% 
Wheat Exports             
  Baseline    1,125  1,161  1,171  1,202  1,200 
  Scenario    1,124  1,161  1,168  1,201  1,201 
  Change    -2  -1  -3  -1  1 
  % Change    -0.2%  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.1%  0.1% 
             
Wheat Farm Price           
  Baseline    2.75  3.08  3.13  3.27  3.26 
  Scenario    2.76  3.07  3.14  3.26  3.26 
  Change    0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
  % Change    0.2%  -0.3%  0.2%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
             
Corn Exports             
  Baseline    2,104  2,104  2,183  2,298  2,344 
  Scenario    2,111  2,103  2,182  2,297  2,343 
  Change    7  -1  -2  -1  -2 
  % Change    0.3%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
             
Soybean Exports           
  Baseline    989  1,045  1,018  995  1,002 
  Scenario    989  1,045  1,019  995  1,002 
  Change    0  1  1  1  1 
  % Change    0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
             
Wheat Trade    (Million Metric Tons) 
  Baseline    89.88  91.20  92.16  93.70  95.97 
  Scenario    89.84  91.21  92.13  93.68  95.99 
  Change    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  % Change    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
             
Corn Trade             
  Baseline    67.74  67.86  68.67  70.89  73.74 
  Scenario    67.76  67.87  68.63  70.88  73.69 
  Change    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  % Change    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0   26
Table 4. Impacts of Removal of Corn Price Support 
  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
Corn Production  (Million Bushels) 
  Baseline  9,426  9,647  10,022  10,130  10,359 
  Scenario  9,323  9,648  10,022  10,145  10,351 
  Change  -103  0  1  15  -8 
  % Change  -1.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  -0.1% 
           
Corn Exports           
  Baseline  2,104  2,104  2,183  2,298  2,344 
  Scenario  2,102  2,098  2,175  2,295  2,343 
  Change  -2  -6  -8  -3  -1 
  % Change  -0.1%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.1%  0.0% 
           
Corn Farm Price           
  Baseline  2.05  2.18  2.18  2.26  2.27 
  Scenario  2.05  2.18  2.18  2.26  2.26 
  Change  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  % Change  -0.1%  0.0%  0.2%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
           
Wheat Exports           
  Baseline  1,125  1,161  1,171  1,202  1,200 
  Scenario  1,132  1,162  1,170  1,202  1,201 
  Change  6  1  -1  0  2 
  % Change  0.6%  0.1%  -0.1%  0.0%  0.1% 
           
Soybean Exports           
  Baseline  989  1,045  1,018  995  1,002 
  Scenario  989  1,045  1,019  995  1,003 
  Change  0  0  1  1  1 
  % Change  0.0%  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
           
World Wheat Trade  (Million Metric Tons) 
  Baseline  89.88  91.20  92.16  93.70  95.97 
  Scenario  89.99  91.30  92.17  93.75  96.02 
  Change  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  % Change  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
           
World Corn Trade           
  Baseline  67.74  67.86  68.67  70.89  73.74 
  Scenario  67.70  67.78  68.58  70.84  73.70 
  Change  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
  % Change  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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Table 5. Impacts of Removal of Wheat  and Corn Price Supports  
  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
Wheat Production  (Million Bushels) 
  Baseline  2,195  2,238  2,339  2,364  2,398 
  Scenario  2,176  2,241  2,336  2,367  2,397 
  Change  -19  4  -3  3  -1 
  % Change  -0.9%  0.2%  -0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 
           
Wheat Exports           
  Baseline  1,125  1,161  1,171  1,202  1,200 
  Scenario  1,129  1,162  1,169  1,201  1,201 
  Change  3  1  -2  -1  1 
  % Change  0.3%  0.1%  -0.2%  -0.1%  0.1% 
           
Corn Production          
  Baseline  9,426  9,647  10,022  10,130  10,359 
  Scenario  9,353  9,628  10,031  10,138  10,353 
  Change  -73  -20  9  8  -5 
  % Change  -0.8%  -0.2%  0.1%  0.1%  -0.1% 
           
Corn Exports           
  Baseline  2,104  2,104  2,183  2,298  2,344 
  Scenario  2,110  2,098  2,175  2,294  2,343 
  Change  6  -6  -8  -4  -1 
  % Change  0.3%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.2%  0.0% 
           
Soybean Exports          
  Baseline  989  1,045  1,018  995  1,002 
  Scenario  990  1,047  1,021  996  1,003 
  Change  1  2  3  2  1 
  % Change  0.1%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2%  0.1% 
           
World Wheat Trade  (Million Metric Tons) 
  Baseline  89.88  91.20  92.16  93.70  95.97 
  Scenario  89.93  91.28  92.16  93.71  96.00 
  Change  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  % Change  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
           
World Corn Trade          
  Baseline  67.74  67.86  68.67  70.89  73.74 
  Scenario  67.73  67.80  68.57  70.83  73.70 
  Change  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
  % Change  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
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